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ABSTRACT
The term 'existentialism* is extremely vague as is the
term 'humanism*„

However, existentialism may be generally

characterized as a protest against moral or physical deter
minism in regard to man.

And 'humanism', in its most general

application may mean any system centered on the concepts of
dignity and freedom of man.

Thus Jean Paul Sartre makes his

existentialism a humanism through the fundament of human free
dom.

He does this by drawing from and synthesizing notions

of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger.

The result is a u-

nique concept of freedom.
Sartre begins, in the manner of Husserl, with a phenom
enological description of reality.

This kind of analysis re

veals only a consciousness, "the being subject", existing sole
ly as the consciousness of something,* "the being object"*

It

is a consciousness situated in the midst of objects which
constitute the world.

Between subject and object stands a

continuous rapport of opposition, of impossible synthesis.
For, to see itself as an obj ect is for consciousness to ne
gate its own existence.

Self-determination is the way con

sciousness maintains itself but only at the price of perpetual
annihilation.

It can never reflect or return upon its sub-

jeetivity without by that fact ceasing to exist as conscious
ness.

Therefore consciousness must remain in a continual

tension of detachment from any concrete determination.
iii
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This

attitude of consciousness is the basis of human freedom.

For

Sartre human freedom comes to be a capacity of the being-foritself to

make itself be in a positive way by pursuing what

it wishes to be without binding itself to any of its own de
terminations,
dom every

Consciousness,in fact, transcends by its free

determination imposed on it!

natural, biological,

or physical.
In its free realization of itself consciousness is given
primacy over the world of objects, which includes all others
outside the individual.

What value they have is freely as

signed to them by consciousness.

Since consciousness is not

limited by a particular form of being, the subject strives
continually to go beyond what it is at any moment.

This is

expressed as a fundamental drive which implies an infinite
possibility of being for the subject, and hence signifies a
will to be God himself.

But since there is no God, “man is a

useless passion". This can only be a humanism on its own
terms but its own terms are those of psychological description.
But it fails as a psychology for the extremes of feeling and
experience are taken as the normal condition of man.

What

was meant to be a practical philosophy comes to be anti-philosophical.

Man is simply an irrational hole in being.

iv
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PREFACE
Jean Paul Sartre calls his philosophy of existentialism
a humanism*

He defends this position chiefly in a lecture

published under the title Existentialisme est un Humanlsme.
But the word "humanism", like the word "culture", has a diver
sity of meanings, most of them very broad,

To encompass all

of these meanings within the ambit of the present work is un
necessary,

It Is sufficient to contrast Sartre's use of the

word humanism with the traditional Christian meaning of the
word.
Essential to Sartre's 'existential humanism' is a unique
concept of freedom.

It will be the work of this paper to as

certain Sartre's notion of freedom and to note seme of its
consequences in the realm of situation ethics.

To this point

no attempt has been made to show the fundamental accord of
existential ethics and situation ethics in its extreme form
and this accord can only be hinted at in this limited work.
However, it can be stated here that certain motives and fac
tors which Sartre pursues to the point of absurdity have been
heartily endorsed by the sltuationists.

If one were to take

away the phenomenological frame and the atheistic presupposi
tions proper’to the existentialism of Sartre, one could say
that the two ethics agree in their general expression, that
Is, with regard to the moral values of conscience (conscious
ness) and its autonomy respecting external norms.
vi
*
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I will proceed by pointing out the development of those
movements and attitudes upon which Sartre draws, and, more
particularly, by briefly explaining the chief sources of Sar
tre's philosophical position.

In the course of the work it

will also be shown how Sartre answers, philosophically, his
own humanist questions.

The legitimacy of Sartre's claim to

humanism will be questioned.

Doctrinal inconsistencies and

historical distortions will be pointed out and, finally, the
consequences for morality of Sartre's notion of freedom will
be explored.
Of the foreign works consulted certain standard transla
tions were used for clarification.

These include the Barne's

translation of I/etre et la Neant (Being and Nothingness)
which w i H be referred to in the text as B.N.

I also used

Bernard Frechtman's translation of Sartre's lecture Existen\

tlalisme est un Humanlsme hereafter cited as Exist.

Further

translations used are the Swenson-Lowries translation of
Kierkegaard's Final Unfinished Postscript. Alexander Dru's
edition of Kierkegaard's Journals and the Macquarrie and Rob
inson translation of Heidegger's Zeln und Zeit (Being and
Time).
I would like to acknowledge my appreciation and grati
tude to

Professor Flood of the Philosophy Department of the

University of Windsor without whose patience and kind atten
tion this work could never have been completed.
vli
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTI ON': BACKGROUND AND ELEMENTS IN
SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM .
Tiie term "existentialism" has been applied to many differ
ent reactions to both rationalism and idealism in literature
and traditional philosophy.

However, the contemporary exis

tentialists are not in agreement on essentials.

Some even

prefer not to be called "existentialist", and even if those
generally held as belonging to the existentialist "school" or
"movement" were in agreement and their thoughts were reduc
ible to a few basic tenets, it is of the very nature of exis
tentialism to deny the priority of any essential note over
existence, even in a mere consideration of the doctrine.

To

add to the confusion the word existentialism is the name of a
"system" of thought.

The meeting point of all sincere exis

tentialists, possibly excluding Thomists who call themselves
existentialists, seems to be in their avowal of individual
ism.

Because existentialism has so many definitions it can

no longer be defined.2

It is better described as a tendency

1 "The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the
repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever,
and especially of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with
traditional philosophy as superficial, academic and remote
from life - that is the heart of existentialism." Vfllhelm
Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York:
1956), p.12.
2 Ae Sartre himself says: "The word existentialism . . .
has been so stretched and has taken on so broad a meaning,
that it no longer means anything at all." Jean Paul Sartre,
Existentialism. Trans. B. Freehtman (New York: 1947), p.14.
1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

or attitude with a few doctrines common to all its exponents.
Taken as an ethico-social phenomenon, existentialism may
be generally characterized as a protest against views of the
world and policies of action in which individual human beings
are regarded as helpless playthings of historical forces or
as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural pro
cesses.

This aspect is negative, as are the protestations of

existentialists against reason.
of crypto-voluntarism.

This is manifested in a kind

All of this throws some light on

Sartre’s existentialism.

The negative elements are present

in Sartre as they were from the beginning in Kierkegaard.

In

fact, the Kierkegaardian lexicon is basic in the vocabulary
of Jean Paul Sartre.
It was from Kierkegaard’s use of it that the word "exist
ence” gained the significance that it now bears as a technical
term in existentialist philosophy.

In non-technical language

anything concretely actual may be said to exist, but in exis
tentialism it is primarily human beings who are said to have
existence.

I'iien Sartre uses the word existence it is in this

sense that he uses it.
The central tenet of Sartre's existential humanism is
Kierkegaard's concept of freedom which he arrived at by an
analysis of becoming. Says Kierkegaard:
If a plan is coming into being,, is changed in
itself, it is not this plan that comes into being;
but if it comes into being unchanged, what is the
nature of the change by which it comes into being?
This change is clearly not a change in essence, but
in being. But this non-being which the subject of
becoming leaves behind must itself have some sort

*

••
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of being.3
The solution to this, according to Sartre, is the concept of
possibility which refers to a being which is nevertheless a
non-being.4
actuality.

Becoming is the transition from possibility to
In this becoming there resides a freedom, for

that which becomes must be possible before it becomes actual
and the possible can never be the necessary.

The necessary

is a determination of essence - that which is necessary is so
by its essence.

But the difference between the possible and

the actual is not of essence but of being; or, not a differ
ence of essence but of existence.

Necessity Is therefore not

a synthesis of the possible and the actual but something that
is essentially different from both, and, since that which be
comes changes from the possible to the actual, that which be
comes cannot be necessary.
Freedom, then, is established at the very core of the ex
istent situation.

It is a continual becoming of possibility

for man, since for man everything becomes.

Within the limited

amount of time allotted to each individual he must go about
his task of choosing continually his course of action, contin
ually effecting his own becoming as it were, but doing so in
anguish and dread because, fully realizing that since "free
dom" is at the core of choice (the core of existence itself),
3 Boren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. Trans. D.F.
Swenson (Princeton: 1940), p.60.
4 Jean Paul Sartre, Being: and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel
Barnes (New York: 1956), p.17.. Hereafter Being: and Nothing
ness will be referred to in the text by the abbreviation BN.

%

■■
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the individual can never know what the outcome of his choice
will he, can never know what will become of him.

Kierkegaard

points out5 that Hegel’s attempt to demonstrate that the world
is a rational system, that “the real is the rational and the
rational is the real," is not only presumptuous but ridicu
lous, for it rests upon the assumption that a particular part
of an as yet uncompleted scheme which is not in process of be
ing created by itself could know what its completed form must
be.

It follows,, then, according to this theory, that no one

can know his place, no one can have his duty proved to him,
but that each must take his courage in both hands and choose
as best he can.

Kierkegaard conceives himself as having to

choose before God with no possibility of knowing whether the
outcome will be his salvation or his damnation.5

But Sartre's

philosophy of engagement presupposes, and transcends Kierke
gaard's choice because he is conscious of his commitment even
as he writes.7
Kierkegaard wrote that "Sickness is the natural state of
Q
the Christian," and Sartre, throughout his works, Implicitly
,

changes this to read:"lausea is the natural state of the con
scious existent." For Kierkegaard God is discovered neither*
5 Soren Kierkegaard, Final Unfinished Postscript. Irans.
Swenson-Lowrie (Oxford:: 1948), p.S61. Hereafter referred to
as FUP»
6 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. Trans. D. Swen
son (Princeton: 1946), p.3.
7 Sartre, Existentialism. Trans. B„ Freehtman
1947), p.66. Hereafter referred to as Exist.

(Hew York:

8 Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, Trans. W. Lowrie
(Princeton: 1940),. p.430.
•«
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by abstract reasoning or demonstration or in nature; religion
is a matter of choice and since men must choose in partial
ignorance they are, therefore, in a condition of anxiety and
must, if they become Christians, pass through despair.9

For

Sartre, however, one must accept this despair; one cannot
pass through it.

That is why “the existentialist thinks it

very distressing that God does not exist.“

(Exist, p.26).

In a word, Kierkegaard's insight into “existence” was
essentially a religious protestation.
ing God.

He saw man as confront

Sartre, however, emerges as a humanist who has re

located Kierkegaard8s religious protest on a moral and purely
temporal plane.
world.

Sartre leaves man, bewildered, in a strange

Through Husserl8s phenomenology, Sartre engages in

' metaphysical problems according to their ethical connotations.
He is principally a moralist analysing metaphysical problems
with moral or ethical overtones.
with the humanist questions:
ture?

He seems to be concerned

What is man?

How can he know what he should do?

What is his na
Is he free to do

whatever should be done?
Before letting Sartre answer these questions, however,
it must be shown that the elements of his existentialist hu9 Subjectivity can be truly subjective only in the con
frontation of the individual with God, since only the abso
lute is completely indescribable beyond the inroads of ab
straction and objectivity.. Only before God is a man really
himself, because it is only before God that he is finally and
irretrievably alone. But before God the finite individual is
as nothing; and it is the bitter realization of that nothing
ness that marks the religious stage of existence.
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manism are not simply "taken" from Kierkegaard bat that they
are Kierkegaard's notions which have been reworked by Martin
Heidegger in the light of Husserl's phenomenology.

In fact,

Sartre's main work is subtitled a "Phenomenological Ontology".
Husserl affirmed that a really significant philosophi
cal renaissance could not consist in merely reviving a system
of Cartesian meditations, let alone in adopting them as a
whole:

nevertheless, in the spirit of Descartes, its real

direction must be upon the deep significance of a radical re
turn to the pure Ego cogito and in reviving the eternal values
which spring from it.

As' Husserl says:-

"The world originates

within us, as Descartes led men to recognize.1,10

He held that

philosophers should turn their attention away from the world
'and toward the inner experiences which are, he says, basic
for our apprehension of the natural world and our thought
about it.

For Husserl, truth, the object of thought, is real

ly or merely an inner experience.
Heidegger follows this course to the extent of claiming
to describe fundamental experiences which are behind our
everyday and scientific knowledge, but his account of what he
finds when he exercises this method is very different from
Husserl’s conclusions.

Husserl was in quest of a "pure logic"

of meanings; phenomenology would accordingly deal with "pure
meanings in their logical interrelations, that is, with pure

10 Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology", Encyclopedia Britapnica, (11th ed.) XVII, 701.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ideal content o n l y . A s

a philosophy, its task would be to

study the necessities and laws and
the pure experiences of the Ego.

identities resident in
For a phenomenologist true

to Husserl's view the essentials of everyday experiences as
well as of scientific investigations, are intuited contents,
12
that is, data of pure consciousness.
The guiding axiom for
Husserl was that things are as they appear, as they seem to
be.13
Heidegger, on.whom Sartre relies

Husserl1s . ..

method,, inverts it so that the emphasis is not c® the "thing
itself" but on existence,■ Heidegger's human existence is de
fined as being-in-the-world or Dasein. "being-there,11 a being
which, without being anything in particular, yet is there,
directly, necessarily bound to the world of objects.

Being-

in-itself is intuited directly, but is without potentiality
14
or purpose, and consequently refers to nothing beyond itself.
This is the fundamental insight of Sartre, namely that the
world in which man finds himself is contingent, gratuitous,
and meaningless.

Order is projected into the world by man,

and is not guaranteed by a God (Bn, p.424).
11 F. B. B. Gibson, The Problem of the Real and Ideal
in the Phenomenology of Husserl (Hew York-: 1931), p.314,
12 Pari Welch, The Philosophy _of Edmund Husserl
York: 1941), p.298.

(Hew

13 See Husserl, Phenomenology, p.702.
14 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Trans. J . Macquarrie and E, Robinson (London: 1962), pp.222-223. Hereafter
referred to as BT.
-
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For the purposes of this analysis the most important as
pect of Heidegger's philosophy is*-its underlying fundamental
feeling of Dasein as being-thrown into the world without hav
ing chosen or willed it.

When it begins to take notice, hu

man existence is already there, already 'embarked', and so it
feels itself precarious, penniless, abandoned.
adventure will end up in the abyss of death.

Besides, the
Meanwhile man,

if he takes his existence seriously, recognizes the nothing
ness, the absolute non-sense of things.

This is dread.^

The me aning of the world, for Heidegger, comes entirely from
oneself, from one's project, that is to say, from the origi
nal and free manner in which one sets out, in which one real
izes himself in the world.

One exists in an authentic fash

ion when, in expectation of ultimate death

one conceives

•projects' which will be at once his meaning and the meaning
of objects, and all for nothing (BT, p.301).
Tnus man is described as cast into an unsympathetic
world in which he tries to achieve purposes all of which will
inevitably come to nothing in death.

He may try to evade the

thought of his own coming dissolution, by living his life in
terms of impersonal and conventional generalities, but he can

15 Martin Kerr, in his glossary for Roger Troisfontalnes,
Existentialism and Christian Thought, trans. M. J, Kerr
(London: 1949')" p.vi says that the word "angoisse", appearing
frequently in the philosophy of Heidegger, is taken over
from Kierkegaard's "Angst" (anguished dread), the deep-down
restlessness, questioning element in man's selfconsciousness
which is aware of freedom, contingency and the awful terror
of annihilation.

. T»

'■

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
only be true to himself by living constantly with the thought
of his eventual heath.

1A

Heidegger's account of man as inevitably given over to
care and subject to a fate to which he can close his eyes but
which he cannot evade is rooted in Kierkegaard and incorpor
ated in the works of Sartre,

Sartre, however, who believes

that Husserl's phenomenology is the method for all philosoph
ical discoveries, does not remain in the sterile world of
Husserl and Heidegger.

Theirs is the world of mere phenomenal

description which Sartre sees as a result of starting with a
reflexive cogito.

For all of the phenomenologists, the cogito

is nothing but consciousness, a consciousness in which,
through reflection, one notices several phenomena and the
description of these phenomena constitutes the phenomenologi
cal method.

In using the phenomenological method, Sartre

avoids Husserl's idealistic procedure.

He goes beyond Husserl

and begins his ontology with his so-called pre-reflexive cog
ito.

What is at stake is the straight and simple affirmation

of external reality (Exist, p.43).
It is from the position of the Cartesian cogito that
Sartre will invaluably show the inconsistency of a belief in
natures and in God.

But it is the "Cartesian God that Sartre

is refuting, not truly the Christian God.

But just how can

Cartesian mathematicism be reconciled with individualistic
liberty in Sartre's existentialism?

It seems that mathemati-

16 Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, Trans. W. Brock
(Chicago: 1949), pp. 224, 383-384.
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10

cism implies a universe of inalterable essences hardly con
sistent with the Tree and autonomous existential man*

But

Sartre solves this problem by pointing out that the entire
mathematical edifice raised by Descartes is subject to the
purely arbitrary whims of a free God.*

Who is® for Sartre®

merely a projection of human freedom of choice®
* * * c'est la Xiberte/ qui est le fon dement du
vrai, et la necessity rigoureuse qui paralt dans
I'ordre des verit&s est elle laSme soutenue par
la continence absolue d 8un libre arbitre
createur.
For Descartes® ideas do not testify to the truth of God,
rather the truth of God guarantees the validity of ideas*
This, for Sartre, is the position of any Christian; he sees,
the problem of God only as a Cartesian construct.

Sartre con

strued Descartes* description of the freedom of God as a dis
located intuition of human liberty*

The Cartesian doctrine

of divine liberty was, according to Sartre, a mere hypostasstization of human liberty of choice*18
Sartre believes his own position to be the logical out
growth of Descartes’system, (Exist*, p*45).

Just as divine

liberty is a hypostastization of human freedom of choice, so

17 J. P« Sartre, Descartes. (Paris: 1946), p*48 "* , «
it is freedom which is the basis of truth, and the strict
necessity which appears in the order of truth is itself
maintained by the absolute contingency of the free will of
the creator*ss
18 Sartre, Descartes, pp* 50-51. n. „ . Descartes finit
par rejoindre et par expliciter, dans sa description de
/
iiberte/ divine, son intuition premiere de sa propre liberte,
dont, il a dit qu8elle *se connect sans preuve et par seule
experience que nous en avons ’*'*
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XI

God is a principle necessary for

the Cartesian system

can be dispensed with if the system is dissolved.

and

God van

ishes if there is no system that needs him as a principle.
Thus the positing of God is purely gratuitous and superflu
ous.

This becomes clear if man is free and without a nature.

To say that man has a nature is to say there is a God.

To

say that man is free and without a nature is to say there is
no God.

Sartre feels that the same reasoning is basic in

both Descartes' and his own argument.

The identification of

Descartes' position with Christianity is cavalier.

To

understand this one need only consult Sartre's introduction
19
to selections he has made from Descartes' works.
Sartre, leaving out the verification of God, assumes
the extreme anti-rational position that the source and ele
ments of knowledge are sensations as they exist in our con
sciousness.

There is no difference between the internal and

the external, as there is no natural phenomenon which could
not be examined psychologically; it all has its "existence"
in states of mind.
Sartre and, " . . .

There is only intuitive knowledge for
intuition is the presence of the thing

in person to consciousness," (B.N., p.173).

This Intuition

for Sartre is the free creativity of the artist, though
Frenchmen today still interpret intuition as Descartes did
in terms of freedom of t h o u g h t , N e v e r t h e l e s s , Descartes
19 Sartre, Descartes. These selections emphasize the
autonomy and freedom of man. See especially pp. 55-56 and
83-84.
■
20 Sartre, Descartes, p.10.
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12
remains the,original exponent of libertlstic humanism.
II faudra deux siecles de crise-erise de la Foi,
erise de la Science - pour que 1'homme recup^re
cette liberty creatrice que Descartes a mise en
Dieu et pour qu1on soupconne enfin cette v^rit#’
,
base essentielle de 1'humanisms.21
Having located himself in a Cartesian world and drawn
from Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre has a propen
sity for psychologizing social relationships from a Nietzschean point of view.

As xid.ll be seen in the next chapter

whenj examining Sartre's analysis of man's relationship with
the "other", Sartre substitutes appropriation for love,
utensility for co-operation, and retaliation in place of sym
pathy for the 'other's

It is sufficient here in the intro

duction to indicate Nietzsche as another possible unacknowl
edged; source of Sartre's existential humanism.

Gabriel Mar

cel has also seen the striking similarities in Sartre's work
and says explicitly:

. » at the root it is Nietzsche far

more than Kierkegaard who is the source of Sartre's existen
tialism - in spite of the fact that he never mentions NletzOp

sche's name."

The "Will to Power" sets up every individual

against every other individual and this is Sartre's world of
"Ho Exit."23

21 Sartre, Descartes, p.51. .
22 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence. Trans.
Manya Harari- (London: 1948), p.17.
23 See Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, Trans.
Stuart Gilbert (lew York: 1955).
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By means of his plays and stories, Sartre is the maker
of a new way of life which he has not yet identified.

In

them his characters never know why they should do what they
do.

They seem to be acting morally without reason.

considers this problem anthropologically.
ready-made code of morals

Sartre

There can be no

for Sartre, because he regards the

death of God asa cultural fact. Once Nietzsche had proclaim]
ed that "God is dead," Sartre saw man as confronted with the
profound responsibility of deciding for himself, choosing for
himself, acting for himself, and being himself.

That is, man

has to choose authentic existence rather than becoming nonauthentic and escaping reality.

The crisis comes about with

the loss of faith in reason, science and logic as well as re
velation.24
Thus without commands, man has neither a past nor a fu
ture; nothing behind him or before him; he is not provided
with anything that can legitimatize his behaviour: "man is
24 Modern loss of faith is not religious in origin; it
cannot be traced to the Reformation and counter-reformation,
and its slope is by no means restricted to the religious
sphere. Moreover, even if we admit that the modern age began
with a sudden and inexplicable eclipse of transcendence, of a
belief in a hereafter, it would by no means follow that this
loss threw man back upon the world. The historical evidence,
on the contrary, shows that modern men were not thrown back
upon this world but upon themselves. One of the most persis
tent trends in modern philosophy since Descartes and perhaps
its most original contribution to philosophy has been an ex
clusive concern with the self, as distinguished from the soul
or person or man in general, an attempt to reduce all experi
ences, with the world as well as with human beings, to exper
iences between man and himself.
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condemned to be free."
Shat is meant by the statement that, “man is condemned
to be free?"

In Sartre's view for man to be free really means

to be free of God.

This freedom from God imposes upon man's

shoulders the unbearable liberty of pitiless atheism.

There

are those who comfortably hold a doctrine of atheism by pre
serving laws of nature which they can fall back on for stand
ards and norms.

But Sartre, along with Nietzsche, feels that

this comfortable position is impossible.

For Sartre it is

impossible to hold for natures If there is no God.

He per

ceives,an annihilation of,nature as a necessary consequence
of atheism.
Sartre does not deny that there are physical things
ruled by constant laws; his point is that, because man Is
free,, natural laws do not apply to men.

For if there were a

God, nature would be his work and then one would have to fol
low nature In order to follow God.

But man is free, therefore
26
what is true for nature is not true for men.
Sartre finds
no difference between a merely natural world and a Christian
25 Jean Paul Sartre, The Reprieve, trans. Stuart Gilbert
(New York: 1947), p„285.
26 This type of reasoning is the result of a necessitar
ian view of nature. It parallels the Graeco-Arabic necessit
arianism in which there had to be a stable relation between
things. This was necessary for there to be a science. There
fore, there had to be stable natures. As a result, their
worlds were described as being eternal and necessary. Histor
ically, Duns Scotus opposed these views. St. Thomas made an
adjustment where he showed that there could not be a free
nature as is found in man. On the other hand, Ocham felt that
there could not be any natures for that would restrict the
freedom of God. And, so also, Sartre does not see. the compat
ibility of liberty and nature.
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world.

Neither one, says Sartre, can be true.

This is the heart of Sartre’s existential humanism:

men
27
are free, and human life starts on the far side of despair.
Once men have realized they are alone, then life begins - in
despair.

Man must accept that he is doomed to have no other

life than his own.

He has to make his own way.

If life be

gins in despair, then the problem is to know how to live with
it.
According to Sartre, this despair is reallya consequence
upon the seeming probabilities of our actions.
hope in our freedom.

We can only

Man is limited to some form of action

which makes that action feasible, and he overcomes the des
pair by hoping in his freedom.

Sartre seems to be returning

to classical stoicism.
Sartre has confronted himself with the philosophical
problem of necessity and contingency.

In his essay "Existen

tialism is a Humanism", God is not even an adversary.

Yet,

one must remember, Sartre’s position is not a naturalism
either, for its center is not nature.

He refuses to deal

with man as a thing determined from without.
philosopher of man's nature.
ist, but a "humanist."

Sartre is not a

He is not a theist or a natural

That is, in a general sense, Sartre

is below God and above nature, his concentration is upon man.
However, in the history of European thought, the term human
ism has had much more specific meaning than merely a concen
27 Jean Paul Sartre, "The Flies", No Exit and Three
Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: 1955^ p.123.
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trating on man.

When one uses the term humanism its meaning

is usually derived from this historical tradition and implies
certain attitudes and values as applied to human nature.

Now

it may be discovered that the connection of Sartre’s use of
the word with the traditional meaning of humanism is very ten
uous.

However, that is a judgment which cannot be made here

but which will be seen through the development of this paper.
One should begin, at least, with generally accepted views of
just what humanism means.
In its narrowest sense humanism, as a term, is used to
describe that kind of study of the Greek and Latin Classics
which is accompanied by the conviction that these classics
contain the highest expressions of human values.

This has

been extended to include subjects which were considered to be
most directly relevant to the right conduct of life.

These

subjects were regularly distinguished from natural sciences
and from metaphysical and theological speculation.

In its

most general application, humanism may mean any system center28
ed on the concepts of dignity and freedom of man.
The great age of Greece issued in an anthropocentric
concentration subsequently adopted by Rome and the thread of
this classical tradition continued to exert an influence dur
ing the middle ages.

However, the great age of humanism is

generally accepted to be associated with the Renaissance be
ginning with Petrarch and Boccaccio in the fourteenth century.
28 Louis J. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism
York: 1936), p.3.

(New
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These men developed a new attitude toward the classical past
and gave an immense prestige to a literary sensibility formed
on. the conscious cultivation of this past.

According to Bab

bits this was due to:

. . . the type of scholar who was not only proficient
in Greek and Latin, but who at the same time inclined
to prefer the humanity of the great classical writers
to what seemed to him the excess of divinity in the
Medievals.20
It was against a distorted view of man’s natural condition
that the Humanists of the Renaissance, rediscovering the
pagan authors, asserted the intrinsic value of man's life be
fore death and the greatness of his potentialities.
The interest in this philological movement was in attain
ing the kind of knowledge which would make men grow in virtue,
and so there had to be included a better understanding of the
Christian traditions as well as the Classics.

The lessons of

history were also needed as a basis for politics and ethics.
Although these were the preoccupations of humanistic thought,
the earlier humanists scorned the philosophy of the schools
and considered the subjects of scholastic science as a perver
sion of the true ends of philosophy.

From the time of Pet

rarch onwards, the humanists argued for a philosophy which
would teach men wisdom rather than an arid art of disputation,
and when they finally did turn to philosophy, it was to the
Platonic30 rather than to the Aristotelian tradition.
29 Irving Babbit, "Humanism: An -Essay at Definition,"
Humanism-and America, ed. N. Forester (Hew York: 1930),
p®26a
30 The Platonic tradition of philosophical thought
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"In the Renaissance itself what the humanists came to empha
size was the principle of mediation between extremes, of proGontlnuation of Footnote 30
started with a reversal and this determined to a large extent
the thought patterns into which Western philosophy almost
automatically fell wherever it was not animated by a great
and original philosophical impetus. Academic philosophy, as
a matter of fact, has ever since been dominated by the neverending reversals of idealism and materialism, of transcend
entalism and inmanentism, of realism and nominalism, of
hedonism and asceticism, and so on. What matters here is
the reversability of all these systems, that they can be
turned upside down or "downside up" at any given moment in
history without requiring for such reversal either historical
events or changes in the structural elements involved. The
concepts themselves remain the same no matter where they are
placed in the various systematic orders. Once Plato had suc
ceeded in making these structural elements and concepts re
versible, reversals within the course of intellectual history
no longer needed more than purely Intellectual experience, an
experience within the framework of conceptual thinking itself.
These reversals already began with the philosophical schools
in late Antiquity and have remained part of the Western tra
dition. It is still the same tradition, the same intellect
ual game with paired antitheses that rules, to an extent, the
famous modern reversals of spiritual hierarchies, such as
Marx1s turning Hegelian dialectic upside down or Nietzsche's
revaluation of the sensual and natural as against the supersensual and supernatural.
The reversal we detal with here although it has frequent
ly been interpreted in terms of the traditional reversals and
hence as integral to the Western history of ideas, is of an
altogether different nature. The conviction that objective
truth is not given to man but that he can know only what he
makes himself is not the result of skepticism but of demon
strable discovery, and therefore does not lead to resignation
but either to redoubled activity or to despair.
The world loss of modern philosophy, whose introspection
discovered consciousness as the inner sense with which one
senses his senses and found it to be the only guaranty of
reality, is different not only in degree from the age-old
suspicion of the philosophers toward the world and toward the
others with whom they shared the world; the philosopher no
longer turns from the world of deceptive perishability to
another world of eternal truth, but turns away from both and
withdraws into himself. What he discovers in the region of
the inner self is, again, not an image whose permanence can
be beheld and contemplated, but, on the contrary, the con
stant movement of sensual perceptions and the no less con
stantly moving activity of the mind. 'Since the 17th century,
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portion and measure,, "31
ism was:

The whole question raised by human

what is the character of man as such, what is the

nature of man?

Through the recognition of intellect and will,

as distinct from matter, three basic positions on this ques
tion of the nature of man are distinguishable in humanist
tradition®

The first is the stoic position that man may

easily learn and follow the laws of nature which concern the
achievement of a well-ordered human life.
“Know thyself,“ for knowledge is virtue0

In other words,
Opposed to this is

the view that man has difficulty discovering these laws and
even when he knows them he does not necessarily follow them.
The third position is the Rousseauian view that the analyti
cal intellect is a hindrance to man who is instinctually good.
All three views are concerned with

human nature and al

though Sartre denies the existence of human nature, it will
be seen that he is closest to the stoic.point of view though
strangely enough accepting the second position as the condi
tion of man. Historical roots for these positions are vague.
It is the second position, that of the depraved state of
human nature which is the most significant in the later
Conclusion of Footnote 30
philosophy has produced the best and least disputed results .
when it* has investigated, through a supreme effort of selfinspection, the processes of the senses and of the mind. In
this aspect, most of modern philosophy is indeed theory of
cognition and psychology, and in the few Instances where the
potentialities- of the Cartesian method of introspection were
fully realized by men like Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche,
-_ one is tempted to say that philosophers have experimented
with their own selves no less radically and perhaps even more
fearlessly than the scientists experimented with nature.
31 Mercier, p.3.
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development of Christian Humanism.

For the Christians the

fall of Adam had disorganized the original natural tendency
of man's intellect, will and sensual appetites to virtue.
To achieve order, the Christians believed that they needed
the help of the grace of God.

In other words, man needed God

to lead even a well-ordered human life in this world, let alone the next.

It is the inversion and degeneration of this

notion into bourgeois humanism and naturalism that Sartre
accepts as the present condition of man.

It is this "accep

ted" condition which Sartre hopes to resolve through a phen
omenology dealing with humanist questions.
Sartre uses the word existentialism, then, to emphasize
the claims that each individual person is unique and inexpli
cable in terms of any metaphysical or scientific system; that
he is a being who chooses as well as a being who thinks or
contemplates; that he is free, and because he is free he suf
fers; and that since his future depends in part upon his free
choices, it is not altogether predictable.

There are also

"overtones" in this special usage of the word which suggest
that existence is something genuine or authentic by contrast
with insincerity, and that a man who merely contemplates the
world is failing to make the acts of choice which his situa
tion demands*

As M. Natanson says:

Existentialism emerges as a deeply felt concern with
and for the concrete reality of the individual; it
Is his existence that is vital, and it is he who must
define himself. It is no longer possible to lose
oneself in the system or hope to reveal existence by
analytic procedures used in the investigation of
"life" or the.; "cosmos"a The individual as such, in
'« ■
-
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his unique subjectivity, in his personal existence,
is at stake; and existentialism holds that the
essence of a person may not be revealed by reference
to an a priori theory of man or any religious
interpretation that speaks of man prior to and apart
from his actual existence.32
It is this notion of human nature as being defined by
freedom which has become the cornerstone of a new ethical
structure whose proponents have as yet presented only an out
line of how it might be constituted.

The specifically athe

istic branch of this ethics is implicit throughout Sartre's
works.
The chief characteristics of Sartre's ethical position
can be summed up briefly in the following points:

the indi

vidual, in an isolation imposed upon him by his freedom and
in response to the requirements of his unique situation, must
make his moral choices and bear responsibility for them.
There are no acts which are good or bad in themselves, no
goals that are automatically worthy.

There are no structures^

of physical nature, reason, or history above which man cannot
rise freely by his self-transcending consciousness of himself.
To this point Sartre does not differ from modern "situatlonr
ist" thinkers, such as Reinhold Niebuhr for example.
What is new in Sartre's ethics is his version of the ex
istentialist virtue of authenticity, which replaces the
Christian love commandment.

Authenticity requires of man not

a code of conduct but a way of life.

An ethics based on an

essentialist view of man tends to take the form of universally
valid content-filled norms, or specific rules of conduct,
32 Maurice Natanson, A Critic of Jean Paul'Sartre1s
Ontology (Lincoln: 1951) p.2
>
•
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which Sartre cannot and does not admit.

Instead he empha

sises the obligation to live in a certain way.

The term ex

istence as used by Sartre therefore sometimes takes on a se
cond meaning, that of true or authentic existence as opposed
to the absurd existence revealed by the experience of nausea.
Existence here is equivalent to the pursuit of transcendent
goals, an important part of the authentic life, (Exist., pp.
59-60).
For Sartre then, authentic existence is directly related
to the being of man.

It is a way of life which is in accord

ance with a realistic grasp of the ambiguous nature of human
reality.
age.

Authenticity is a kind of honesty or a kind of cour

The authentic individual faces something which the un-

authectie individual is afraid to face.33

That which he faces

is the fact that he is nothing apart from his actions, the
necessity to pursue transcendent goals, the realization that
these goals are of his own choice and that he is responsible
for what he has done in their pursuit.
Sartre does not envisage authenticity as simply the ac
ceptance of a certain attitude toward human reality and the
world.

This is necessary and he says that man must assure

his freedom.

But true existence, for Sartre, is something

beyond the assumption of an attitude; it is the making of free
decisions.
o . . if man has once become aware that in his forlornness he imposes values, he can no longer want
33 Marjorie Grene, "Authenticity: An Existentialist
Virtue," Ethics, LXII, Ho. 4 (July, 1952), p.267.
>■
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but one thing, and that is freedom, as the basis of
all values. . . . the ultimate meaning of the acts
of honest men is the quest for freedom as such,
(Exist., pp. 53-54).
This ‘free1, self-conscious commitment to a preoccupa
tion with one's integrity will be more clearly understood
after a closer examination of the condition of man and the
concept of freedom in Sartre's view.

•« ■
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CHAPTER II
THE CONDITION OF MAW AND THE IDEA OF FREEDCM
IW JEAN PAUL SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM
In order to view the condition of man from Sartre's
point of view it is necessary to place oneself within the
context of an existential epistemology.

For the existential

ist real knowledge must always refer to the knower as an ex"7.A

isting individual. ^

Now one consequence of this demand is

that there is a basic opposition between abstract thought and
the real being* for reality cannot then be conceived or
grasped in a concept.35

In other words, the concept of exis

tence is an ideality and the difficulty is, whether existence
can be reduced to a concept.

For it is precisely because I

exist and the things among which I exist also exist that I am
separated from them.

So existence separates, and since it is

the function of thought to unify, thought finds> resistance to
34 As Kierkegaard so well states it: "That essential
knowledge is essentially related to existence does not mean
the above-mentioned identity which abstract thought postulates
between thought and being; nor does it signify, objectively,
that knowledge corresponds to something existent as its ob
ject, but it means that knowledge has a relationship to the
knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and for
this reason all essential knowledge is essentially related to
existence." Soren Kierkegaard, The Final Unfinished Post
script „ Trans. Swenson-Lowrie, (Oxford: 1948), p«177. Here
after referred to as F.U.P.
35 "To do so is to reduce it to possibility, but in that
case It is impossible to conceive it, because to conceive it
Is to reduce it to possibility and consequently, not to hold
fast to it as reality." Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals of
El '-egaard, Trans. Alex Dru (London: 1957), #1054.
24
>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
its activity in the very fact of existing.

For that reason

an existential system is a radical impossibility (F.U.P.,
p 0107),
In terms of the individual who must lead his life in
very precise and unique circumstances, this means that reason
is really cut off from existence and life:
It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life
must be understood backwards. But they forget the
other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.
And if one thinks over that proposition it becomes
more and more evident that life can never really be
understood in time simply because at no particular
moment can I find the necessary resting place from
which to understand it - backwards. (J., #465).
In actual living, Kierkegaard goes on, the individual is re
quired to make decisions, choose and act.

His reason, how

ever, tells him he can do one thing just as well as another
and that is tantamount to telling him that he cannot act at
all.

Reflexion is simply an equilibrium of possibilities and

one cannot act on such a basis.

He is

then

caught in the

incongruity between action and reflection; he must do that
which is literally absurd to his reason.

In the concrete,

then, reason always comes to grief in absurdity.

Recourse

must be had, then, to something other than rational knowledge
and to means other than reason, for attaining it.
Sartre's analysis and the view of man that results from
it are really inspired by Heidegger's search for an answer to
the question:

what is Being?

At the beginning of his main

work Seln und Zeit, Heidegger stresses the need for a return
to ontology.

Being, he states CB.I., p.25) occupies a

OHltESiTY GF E D J S LIBRARY
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central role in all of our thoughts and activities; it is the
most universal of concepts; it is incapable of being defined,
it includes man in its universality; we live within it and
yet its meaning is always shrouded in darkness*

Investigat

ing the meaning of Being is, then, the basic question in
philosophy (B.l*, p.23; p.48).

But Being has certain demands

to make of that investigation. The investigation cannot be
pushed arbitrarily, the question can only be asked and answer
ed by one who is a Being*

So of all the things to which we

apply the term “Being*',, only one can properly handle the in
vestigation, that is, a Being that looks at or examines it
self.

Man is just such a Being.

Heidegger calls him Pasein.

A correct and clear formulation of the meaning of Being de
mands, then, a preliminary explanation of the Being of man
(B.l,, p*29):

the nature of Sein must be determined by anal

ysing Pasein.

What Being is will be determined by what the

Pasein is, and for Heidegger the "essence" of Pasein rests in
its existence* "Existence" being used not in the traditional
sense of existentia. he says (B.l., p.65), nor as a property
of an actual Being but as the Sein des Paseins. that is, hu
man existence.

So the answer to our ontological question

must come from a Being that reveals itself to itself and man
is such a self-revealing Being.

In this sense, man is onto

logical to the core.
If, however, this is true then Being is to be found in
the phenomenon.

Heidegger (B.I., p.SOX points out that the

Greek worl.JEHSEilL. to which our word goes back, means "to
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be revealed" or "to show itself".
which reveals or shows itself.

So a phenomenon Is that

Ian, then, is a phenomenon

and the nature of being will be revealed in penetrating the
meaning of phenomenon and discovering just what it implies.
In a word, for Heidegger,

phenomenology as a study of pheno

menon and ontology (the study of being) are not two distinct
disciplines belonging to philosophy.

Bather the two titles

stand for philosophy according to its method in one case, ac
cording to its object in the other.

Philosophy is a universal,

phenomenological ontology taking its point of departure in an
interpretation of man's Being, an analysis of whose existence
provides the clues needed in all philosophical questions.
It is likewise

with an analysis of phenomena that Sartre

begins his L'^tre et le N^ant and with an analysis of human
existence that he goes on to determine the meaning of being.
Realizing that Being is phenomenon

is, he tells us, (B.l.,

p.XLV) the great advance made by modern thought, inasmuch as
it allows us to reduce the existent to the series of appear
ances that reveals it.

Thus, he says (B.N., p.XLVI), we at

tain the notion of phenomenon as it can be encountered in the
phenomenology of Husserl or Heidegger, for example.
existent, then, is what reveals itself.

(The

Notice that it does

not reveal .anything within itself, it simply reveals itself .),;
There is not something real inside it which the appearance,
manifests; its appearing is precisely what is revealed.

The

dualism of being and appearing can no longer have a rightful
claim on philosophy, for here we are confronted with a
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phenomenon, that is an absolute.
peXLVI),

Phenomenon is the real (B.W.,

In short, phenomenology is a direct looking upon or

inspection of the givens of sensory experience.

Such inspec

tion confronts one, first of all, with "appearances*1.

In the

sense that one is presented with them, these appearances are.
They would not be appearances unless they appeared.

'But if

these appearances are, then, according to Sartre, we have lo
cated Beingj for appearance .is being.

"It is.

only manner of defining its manner of being."

That is the
"Being is sim

ply the condition of all revelation." (B.W., p.XLIX).
Wow just what does phenomenon reveal?

Well, if there is

to be appearance there must be that which appears and that to
which it appears; an act of being perceived and one of per
ceiving; the perceived and the perceiver; the object and the
subject.

In referring the components of these pairs one to

the other, does the perceiving constitute the perceived so
that the obj ect’s esse would be nercini?
(B.W.., p.L).

Wo, says Sartre

Every idealism, he points out, seeks to reduce

being to the knowledge that is had of it, but to be wellfounded it should first establish the being of knowledge on
which being depends.
perclni

Failure to do that means the esse est

rests on nothing at all.

Consequently, Sartre feels

that in any solid doctrine, the being of knowledge must rest
on something beyond knowledge, something that escapes the
percipi (B.W., p.LI).
nothingness,

Otherwise knowledge itself falls into

So to his mind the relation between perceiver

and perceived must be an entitative or transphenomenal
*
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reference of object to subject, subject to object (B.W*.,
p.LI).
On the side of the subject, such transphenomenal dimen
sion is constituted by consciousness in self, for as Husserl
has seen so well,^6 all consciousness is consciousness of and
is intrinsically intentional (B.W*, p.-LI).
referred to object entitatively.

It Is, therefore,

Pleasure, for example, is

an event before it is a representation of a pleasant object
(B.W*, p.LV)•

In a word, the phenomenon implies an intention

al subject, the so-called "consciousness-self", which is the
subject of the most concrete experiences but which Is more
truly Identical with those experiences than related to them.
It has nothing substantial about it;, it is a pure appearance
in the sense that the subject is a pure self-awareness ident
ical with an awareness of (B.W., p.LV).

As for the object,

its percipi does not depend on reflexive consciousness so as
to be constituted what it is by being known.

It depends,

rather, on the pre-reflexive consciousness in that it is de
manded transphenamenally as the obj ect of intentional con
sciousness.

In the manner of Husserl, the being of the cogito

pre-reflexively requires the intentionality of the ego and the
being of the obj ect: not, as Sartre very carefully points*
out, (B.W.-, p.LIX) as the noema is the simple correlative of
the noesis, for then the obj ect would be constituted by being
known, but as something transcendentally demanded by the very
E» Husserl, Meditationes Cartesian
1947), p®28.

%

(Vrin, Paris:
- . •

.
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being of consciousness.

Its independence of the subject is,

indeed, Indicated by the constant stress Sartre places on its
being active, never passive, (B.Itf..s p.LVIII).

In short,

being or phenomenon demands a subject and object intrinsical
ly related one to the other:

a being or phenomenon which is

phenomenon because it is aware of itself in all appearing,
that is, it is a self-awareness or "being-for-itself"; and a
being or phenomenon appearing to consciousness as a transphen
omenal object of that consciousness but not reflexively aware
of itself, that is, a "being-in-itself",

There are, then,

two orders in phenomenon, the pour-sol and the en-sol. (B«U,,
p®iXV).
senses

The pour-soi is consciousness in its most simple
For Sartre, speculation begins in subjectivity; more

specifically, it begins with the Cartesian cogito, which is
taken to be the root of all judgments and all cognition.

It

is “an absolute truth founded upon the immediate grasp which
consciousness has of itself, and as such is the basis for all
37
other certain truths."
Sartre recognizes, however, a prereflective as well as a reflective cogito. and through an ex
amination of the pre-reflectlve cogito he tries to give a gen
eral understanding of the en-soi, the other pole of being.
The pre-reflective cogito is the basis for the reality
of consciousness; for there can be no consciousness where
there is no reference to an object.

This is ", . • the only

mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of
37 j, Collins. “The Existentialism of J. p. Sartre'*,
“Thought, Vol. XXXII;(March, 1948)3 69.:.” ~
• *
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something", (B.N., p.LIV).

Consciousness cannot exist apart

from its active unfolding in the acts of consciousness.
Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure
appearance in the sense that it exists only to the
degree to which it appears. But it is precisely
because consciousness is pure appearance, because
it is total emptiness (since the entire world is
outside it) - it is because of this identity of
appearance and existence within it that it can be
considered as the absolute, (B.N., p.LVI).
Consciousness is thus the cause of its own manner of being
and is the identity of appearance and existence.

Sartre's

recourse to the pre-reflective cogito enables him to escape
from the infinite regress of "knowing known"; for the coincid
ence of existence and appearance indicates that the pre-reflective cogito is an absolute in the order of existence and
a condition of all knowledge.
However, consciousness is more than self-reflection; all
consciousness is consciousness .of something.
intends some object in the world.

Consciousness

What is intended, says

Sartre, is some "trans-phenomenal" being beyond consciousness.
The realm of trans-phenomenal being is the realm of the ensoi.

For Sartre, the en-soi is the rough "is-ness" of being,

the brute confrontation of being; the "stuff" of the world.
Thus the being of consciousness faces the being of the pheno
menon:- the pour-soi faces the en-soi, and although both may
be identified by a subjective analysis, they remain in alien
and severed realms.

If the pour-sol can be identified or de

fined as consciousness, then the en-soi may be defined as the
trans-phenomena! being of the object.
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Consciousness implies in its very being a non-conscious,
trans-phenomenal being.

“Consciousness is a being such that

in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being
implies a being other than itself," (B.N., p#LXII),

The pour-

soi (consciousness) is nothingness*
Wnat, then, does the pour-soi as consciousness reveal to
us of the nature of being?

Well, it is the self-revealing,

and since our basic ontological situation demanded that being
question itself, let us see what the pour-soi tells us of
being in the experience of questioning.

Any question, as

distinct from an affirmation, demands that a yes or no answer
be possible.

In asking a question one must accept the possi

bility of the non-existence of the being he questions.

In

addition, he reveals himself to be in a state of indetermin
ation in even asking the question.
bridge between two non-beings:

A question, then, is a

the non-being of knowing on

the side of the questioner, the non-being of the transcendency
on the side of the one questioned.
is being?

So in merely asking:

what

a new dimension of being has been revealed — • non-

being, (B.N,, p.5),
On the side of the pour-soi such "non-being" is not only
revealed as a condition of my confronting myself so as to be
able to question myself, but also of questioning other men or
things.

To question them the pour-soi must in some way remove

itself from being.

On the side of the en-soi as object of the

conscious attention involved in questioning, it must appear
capable of giving a negative reply.
*

For if a question is

•
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aroused in a questioner by anything that just is, then it is
occasioned by something completely and universally determined
and the question would cease to be even

conceivable,

fore, the en-soi must appear capable of not-being.
appear haunted by “non-being,"

Ihere.-

It must

According to Sartre (B.N,,

p.8-12), it is by the attention of the pour-soi. in this case
Illustrated by questioning but just as well by expectation or
any other conscious attitude, that “non-being" comes into be
ing.

But for our present purposes, the important thing to

note is that a fundamental note of being, its “non-being",
has been revealed by analysing human existence.

That "non-

being" is just as transphenomenal and objective as is being;
subject and object are just as transcendentally nothing.

We

have, then, in the case of Sartre, a definite conception of
being taking shape even though it is properly man that is
under examination.

In a word, man's existence proves a key

to the nature of being itself.
In developing his notion of the pour-soi Sartre was re
casting In his own way the Pasein of Heidegger which is found
identified with human existence,

Man is a "being-for-himself,;”

a phenomenon and a "consciousness-self,"

At the extreme of

that consciousness, through the attention man pays to the ob
ject of his consciousness, negativity or "non-being" enters
being.
be.

It is through man as pour-soi that non-being comes to

His being is, properly speaking, to negate being; negate

it as by a positive, concrete act of negating.
is really the link in being.

In short, man

The apparent hiatus •in being
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caused by the distinction between pour-soi and en-soi is
bridged by a synthetic bond which is nothing else but the
pour-soi itself, (B*N,, p«617).

The pour-soi is, indeed,, but

a pure negating of the en-soi.

It is like an entitative; gap in

being.

It is a creative gap, for by its negating attention

the pour-soi makes a nothing of the Individual en-soi and out
of this overthrowing of the en-soi a world is made, (B.U.,
p.LXV). In a word, man's attention singles out of a vast back
ground certain en-soi that now become objects of his conscious
ness and constitute ‘his1 world.
attention*

Man creates a world by his

It is, then, out of his negativity that a world

appears, a negativity that Sartre attempts to express, (B»U.,
p 0LXV) by saying of the pour-soi: it is not what it is, and
it is what it is not#
The "facticity" of the pour-soi is its pastness, (B,N.,
p«118),

The facticity of the pour-soi is threatened and en

croached upon by the en-soi: the "in-itself" attempts to swal
low up the "for-itself."

The "was" characterizes the type of

being of the pour-soi: it characterizes the relation of the
pour-soi to its being.

The past is the en-soi which I am,

considered as passed beyond.

The past is "in itself" and "I

am for-myself," therefore the "Cartesian cogito ought to be
formulated rather, "I think; therefore I was," (B,N,, p»119).
In other words, I am the man who "was" the man.

But in the

same sense in which I am the man who was, I certainly am not
the man who was, for I am the man I am.
The pour-soi. when it becomes pastness, is seized by the
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en-soi and rendered "facticity", but since the present is
pour-soi,, a paradox is involved.

Alt bough, for Sartre, the

present must be defined in terms of being, whenever the at
tempt is made to specify the present there is left only an
infinitesimal instant, a nothingness.

This, Sartre points

out, is the fundamental contradiction of existence:

there is

always the indissoluble pair, being and nothingness.
The pour-soi. as present, cannot be seized as such be
cause the present is a perpetual flight in the face of being.
The present cannot truly be seized in any of its instants,
for these instants themselves are in flight,
Yet the pour-soi exists only because it has a future.
The pour-soi of the present reveals the pour-soi yet to be.
The "project" is held before the pour-soi as its image-to-be.
The future world, says Sartre, "has me aning as a future only
insofar as I am present to it as "another" who I will be, in
another position, physical, ©notional, social, etc., (B.Ho,
p.127).

Sartre concludes that "I must become what I was, but

in a world that has become from the standpoint of what it is.
This means that I give to the world its own possibilities in
terms of the state which I apprehend on it," (B.Itf,, p.127).
The totality of the self then, arises from the unity of
past, present and future with the liaisons of "was-ness" and
"flight" which bind them together dialectically.
The self holds within it the problem of its freedom, for
the flight of the pour-soi toward its future is its measure
of freedom to become what it will be.

This freedom, for
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Sartrea is unique.

The pour-soi does not accept or reject

its freedom in a purely conceptual way.
The future constitutes the meaning of my present
pour-soi. as the project of its possibility, but
that in no way pre-detemines my pour-soi which
is to come, since the pour-soi is always abandoned
to the nihilating obligation of being the founda
tion of its nothingness, (B.N., p.128).
Sartre concludes then, that the pour-soi cannot avoid its
"problematicity" since the pour-soi itself is problematic in
the sense of continually being faced by an uncertain future.
This is what Sartre means when he asserts that man is a being
whose meaning is always problematical.

And so, the pour-soi

can never be anything but problematically its future, for it
isseparated from that
self is.

future by a nothingness which it it

The pour-soi is free and its freedom is to itself

its own limit.

' '

The nothingness of the pour-soi. is for Sartre, the pos
sibility of freedom.

Freedom is the "possibility for the hu

man reality to secrete a nothingness which isolates" and
"freedom is the human being putting its past out of play by
secreting his own nothingness," (B.H., p.28).
It is in virtue of that negativity (particularly its
creative, projecting tendencies) that man is not said to be,
but to be towards being, (B.W., p.LXV).

And because he is

such a negative, projecting being, he is free.

It is by his

negativity that he escapes causal laws, (B.U.., p.23), it is
by projecting that nothingness into other beings in expecting
then to be other than they are that they too are seen to
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escape those same causal laws in some measure*

Every human

attention, be it question, expectation, imagination or emotion
is really a judgment that "non-being" is possible in things,
that they can be other than they are, that they escape rigid
determinism.

So negativity is the root and foundation of hu

man liberty, (B*N., p«24)„

In short, negativity, being to

wards and standing outside being all add up to one thing:
liberty.
It is this identification of man with freedom that Sartre
has in mind in speaking (Ex., p.18) of man in pure subject
ivity and as a being that just appears in the world:

to be

free man must just appear, exist and then freely define him
self in existing.

In this sense his existence is a primary

fact, his essence must come from what he wills to make himself.
The constant exercise of that freedom, that is to say his con
stant existing, is attested by the feelings of anguish, for
lornness and despair that in some degree or other accompany
every choice he makes.
Nothingness reveals freedom and also reveals our anguish.
, „ . it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness
of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is the mode
of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is
in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question
for itself, (B.N*, p.22).
Anguish should be distinguished from fear.

Fear Is of things

of the world, whereas anguish is anguish before oneself; it
is the fear of having fear or the consciousness of freedom.
In other words it is fear of the non-specific or a fear of
possibles. But Inasmuch as he is a pour-soi, h e .is properly
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manin choosing rather than allowing his decisions
for

to be made

him impersonally: he is condemned to be free, but to be

free he must choose.

Thus, liberty becomes the only value

that really guarantees humanity to man, it is the link that
binds together all 'human' phenomena. (Ex.., p.56).

In this

sense freedom is the essence of man*
These notions of Sartre being established, It is now
possible to delineate his concept of freedom which is a nec
essary establishment for positing Sartre's ontology as a con
dition for humanism.
According to Sartre,' every action is, in principle, in
tentional,

True action implies a consciousness of acting on

the part of the actor.

Since action is necessarily intention

al, no political or economic fact can cause action in the In
dividual,

“The indispensable and fundamental condition of all

action is the freedom of the acting being," (B.N., p.436),
Freedom is evidenced in the pour-soi insofar as the poursoi exists as "lack".
ness,

The lack of the pour-soi is its nothing

Because the pour-soi “exists" itself through flight,, it .

is nothing, for its existence is always non-static.

The pour-

soi is not that which it is and is that which it is not.
Choice, freedom and action are inextricably bound to
gether In the existence of the pour-soi.

There can be no

freedom If there is no choice; there can be no choice if there
Is no freedom; there can be no action where there is no free
dom.

And yet, as Sartre says:
To choose ourselves is to nihilate ourselves;' that is

■« ■
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to cause a future to come to make known to us what
we are by conferring a meaning on our past. Thus
there is not a succession of instants separated by
nothingnesses - as with Descartes - such that my
choice at the instant I can not act on my choice
of the instant I. To choose is to effect the up
surge along with my engagement of a certain finite
extension’of concrete and continuous duration,
which is precisely that which separates me from the
realisation of my original possibles. Thus freedom,
choice, nihilation, temporalization are all one and
the same, (B.N*, p.465).
Sartre does not accept the common notion of freedom
which is a description of those conditions external to man
which allow him to choose among alternatives but rather free
dom for Sartre is a state of being of the pour-soi to which
it is condemned.

"We are a freedom which chooses, but we do

not choose to be free.

We are condemned to freedom, as we

said earlier, thrown into freedom or • • • abandoned." (B.2J..,
p©.485).

Since the pour-soi is in question in its being, free

dom is its condition.

"Freedom . . .

on or a property of my nature.

is not a quality added

It is very exactly the stuff

of my being," (B.Ef., p.439).
To comprehend Sartre's freedom, one must keep in mind
that for Sartre human reality is its own nothingness.
pour-soi, in order to be, must choose itself.

The

There is no a

priori essence or God-given human nature that the pour-sol
can depend on or cling to.

The pour-soi. "without any help

whatsoever . . . is entirely abandoned to the intolerable
necessity of making itself be - down to the slightest detail.
Thus freedom is not a being; it .is the freedom of man - i.e.
his nothingness of being, " (B.k7., p.441).

V

■
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Taken ontologically essence is a necessary determination,
and in this present case would mean that man must be man.
But existentially man can be "not-man" by being inauthentic,
that is to say he can simply go along with the crowd, so to
speak, in his ordinary daily existence.
responsibility he Is not properly man*

In fleeing personal
Existentially, then,

man does not have to be man, 'human1 does not exercise a
necessary determination.

But what is existentially necessary

is that for man to be man he must choose.

In that sense free

dom makes man to be man, it is the definition of man, (Ex*,,
p.54) - but surely it is a moral definition.
The constant insistence that phenomenological analysis
is descriptive, is noteworthy.

38
Husserl
has called it "a

new, descriptive, ph.il,osophical method" and has suggested its
use in completely revising the sciences.

It is a search for

essences but it is primarily psychological in object and in
method, hence the strong atmosphere of psychology in Heidegger
and Sartre.

How recognizing that most of our contemporaries

are trained to handle psychological data rather than the sub
tleties of theology and metaphysics, one might well consider
using such phenomenological analysis in searching for and the
defence of a doctrine of essences.

But a reworking of such

basic notions as experience, consciousness, intent!onality,
meaning and evidence would certainly be a prerequisite.
Farther, the investigations that have been examined here
38 Husserl, "Phenomenology", Bncyc. Brit., Vol. 17,
p.6998 (Hew York: 15th ed., 1932).
. •
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are basically moral, and in this ontological considerations
are secondary to moral ones.

For Sartre being is meaningful

in terms of man and man is defined by what he choosesj he ex
ists in action, freedom is the supreme value and freedom is
found in the transcendence of negativity that explains our
knowing or being conscious®

In short, moral questions com

mand the phenomenological analysis which then becomes a search
for negativity.

To find it one is forced to examine phenomena,

for a being that is other than phenomena will have a structure;
it will just be and thereby resist freedom.

It is not sur

prising then, that Sartre himself should conclude:

“thus,

existential psycho-analysis is a moral description because it
gives us the ethical meaning of different human projects,"
, p.626)*
ing.

In short, the being in question is moral be

In that perspective the notion of man being uncaused,

making his own nature, creating his own world, being his past
and the mystery of his being are all meaningful.

Consequent

ly, analysing such conclusions as are presented by Sartre
should be the work of the moralist primarily.
If that is so it is obvious that the constant insistence
on concreteness as opposed to abstraction becomes understand
able.

What is actually here is an appeal that moral being be

treated as a distinctive kind of being, that is a free move
ment towards an end rather than a being centered in its own
metaphysical act.

To complicate matters further, however,

the greatest stress is laid on considering such being at its
most circumscribed and individual level:

the point where
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choice initiates the act towards its end, a point that must
be experienced and is strictly incapable of formulation*

One

should insist, however, that even here there is a radical in
telligibility to be recognized.

Unfortunately, for Sartre,

the Kantian antithesis of speculative and practical reason
has cast its shadow over his analysis as it has been followed,
so that his resulting treatment of moral being is a non-intel
lectual one*
for Sartre.

Thus, the moral order becomes an order of magic
One must

strive to reintegrate intellectual

principles into the moral order without destroying the formal
character of moral being:'

the moral must be shown to be "in

telligible11 and at the same time "free."

To do this it is

necessary to remove the illusion that intellectual principles,
since they guide speculative reason, bring physical necessity
in their wake and are antithetical to freedom.
And finally,, to do so it would appear necessary to insist
on the fundamental difference between physical and spiritual
nature. Tne former is closed by matter and determined in oper
ation; the latter open and free in operation, containing
rather than being contained.
Eat since the analysis of Sartre's investigation of be
ing shows his consideration to be basically moral, there is
one more concept in his phenomenology which must be looked at
before attempting to assess his existential humanism*

It is

the relation of the "self" to the "other".
For Sartre the "other" is immediately known or "encount
ered".

It has the nature of a contingent but irreducible
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factS/ and therefore Sartre says that the existence of the
"other1' cannot be derived ontologically.

And yet, for Sartre,

there is in every day reality an original relation to the
"other" which can be constantly sought and which is disclosed
outside of all reference to God.
The basis for this original relation to the other is the
very "appearance" of the other.

As Sartre says, "the very

appearance of the other in my; universe of an element of dis
integration of this universe is what I call the appearance of
a man in my universe," (B.flT., p.225)„

The other shocks this

world of self in an original, unique and irreducible manner.
"I cannot be the object of an object," says Sartre, and yet,
. • at each instant the other looks at me," (B.N*, p.257).
The basis of the solution to the problem of the other
will be
seen?

the "look". But what does it mean, for Sartre, to be
"The other'slook hides his eyes; he seems to go in

front of them," (B.N., p.258).

What Sartre is referring to,

here, is the conscious look of another - which has already
been shown to be a, nothingness which nlhllates.
What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches
crackling behind me is not that there is someone
there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body
which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I
can not in any case escape from the space in which I
am . . . in short, that I am "seen", (B.U., p.259).
As
done or

long as oneis a pure consciousness of things to be
to be used,he is safe.

"I do what I have t o .do.

Wo

transcending view comes to confer upon my acts the character
of a given on which a judgment can be brought to bear," (B.W.,
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p.259).
Shame reveals to the self the look of the other.
myself because somebody sees me,'* (B.N., p.260).

*'I see

Shame, for

Sartre, means that "I am the object the other is looking at,”
(B.N., p.261).

To apprehend himself as seen is, for Sartre,

the alienation of the world which he organized.

The other is

the hidden death of his possibilities in the world.

The

other looks at him and in the look, shocks or haemorrhages
his inner unity, his inner world, his subjectivity.

The re

covery of this inner world of the self is possible by a re
taliation against the other, i.e,, by making the other the
object of my look and destroying his inner unity.

By the look

of the other Sartre has been made an object for the other's
subjectivity and the other knows him only as object, never as
subject.

In the same manner, Sartre knows the other as ob

ject, never as subject.
This very notion extended to include a social conscious
ness leads men through bad faith, to postulate the existence
of God by the experience of being an ”us-object”.
This experience occurs when a group Identifies itself
as such In relation to another group or person who
looks at them as obj ects. A number of persons see
themselves as forming a definite group or community
when they find themselves so classed in the view of
a third party. If the third party is a foreigner, the
reaction is a consciousness of nationality. For
example, the presence of the bourgeois is required for
the class solidarity of the proletariat,39

39 Norman Greene.
1960), p.70.

The Existentialist Ethic

(Ann Arbor:

*
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This effort at recovering the human totality can not
take place without positing the existence of a "third",
who is on principle distinct from humanity and in
whose eyes humanity is wholly object . . . this con
cept is the same as that of the being-who-looks-at
and who can never be looked-at; that is, it is one
with the idea of God, (B*H,, p„423).
Bearing these notions of the totality of the self, the
nihilation of God, the shock of the •'other11,, the anguish of
choice and the condemnation to freedom, it is time now to
determine the implications for modern morality of Jean Paul
Sartre's concept of freedom as made explicit in his existen
tial humanism®
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HI

CONCLUSION AND CRITICISM REGARDING
JEAN PAUL SARTRE8S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM
Given the essentialambiguity of the “human

condition'*,

of a freedom — situated, two alternatives remain
sciousness:

open to con

to lose self in the objective or to establish

self in pure freedom by renunciation of fixed determinations,
of every form of concrete existence.

According to Sartre the

only authentic attitude, the only morality which

can save the

true nature of consciousness is neither of the alternatives
mentioned, but the engagement of self with objects without at
the same time becoming the slave of the en-sol. an engagement
in freedom that is always active and repudiative,

constantly

engaged with the world yet never estranged from self, ever
disposed to new realisations but never moulded to some static,
definite manner of being.
The freedom of ambiguity represents a conquest which
each one must reach by himself through personal and painful
effort.

From the initial, spontaneous encounter with the

world by which one is enticed and disarmed by it one must
pass through the phase of the reflection which is complicity
to that of the reflection which is purification.

In this

final stage is placed the moral problem of fidelity to the
authentic demands of the human condition.

Man must continu

ally make choices, create for himself his particular essence,
46
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fora his personality.

It is not something already constituted

by a natural determinism but something demanding discovery or
invention? by each person:

in this consists man's particular

moral duty.
The idea of a totally personal solution of moral problems,
a solution "created" from situation to situation, is a focal
point common to some extent to all existentialist theoreti
cians,

In It there is nothing absolute or universal which

would be valid for all individuals, since the real is always
the concrete and particular,

Man can never appeal to univer

sal norms to escape the obligation of judging for himself
what conduct he ought to assume in this instance of existence.
Sartre is adverse to all that is fixed, definite or im
personal.

These are in fact characteristics of the "absurd"

to which the dynamism of the "being-for-itself" is opposed,
Sartre invokes an "existential psychanalysls" which controls
behavior and the projected ends of the Individual and places
him on guard against the enslavement of freedom in a mode of
being which is not authentic, that is, not ambiguous.
Every objective value which man seeks to realize is lost
In the effort if he makes it his goal.

Even the attempt to

become God "that is, to be of oneself the conscious founda
tion of one's own en-sol" is a self-contradictory project in
asmuch as it would necessarily bring one to a fixation of
consciousness in a determinate state and therefore to the ex
tinction of freedom.
For Sartre, consequently, the good or evil of acts does
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not derive from an external norm*

Ike will itself bestows

good or bad upon them by willing them freely*

Man can will

everything and never reject anything, because by the very
fact that he wills anything at all that thing becomes fully
licit*

Sartre's ideal of an authentic realization of the

"conscious being" is that of a freedom which is totally in
toxicated with itself, which refuses none of its possibilities
of being, which is permitted everything, which rejects every

restriction that pretends to bind it, and at the same time a
freedom which attaches itself to nothing, which binds itself
to none of those things which it chooses to be or which it
does*
The affirmation of a total and gratuitous human freedom
as opposed to a superior and all comprehensive moral order,
both divine and natural, releases man from any directive bond
whatever and crowns him with an autonomy as absolute as it is
vacuous*

No value can now impose itself upon him asobliga-

tosy, The individual becomes the creator of his values, his
own internal law.

It is clear that this is an ethic of the

arbitrary and hence no ethic.

Human life according to Sar

tre, with all the moral values by which humanity lives and
is nourished, is simply impossible*

Without God man cannot

comprehend even himself.
The extraordinary appeal of Sartre is witness to his ablllty to grasp and interpret the spiritual situation of the
post-war generation*

To young people who place no hope in

anything, he has cast a new anchor of salvation, however

>
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strange it may seem,

their very desperation.

as you like, without willing anything.

He says:

live

This is freedom.

Desperation is itself a way of life, indeed, the one most
consonant with the insignificance of llfe.4^
A lucid despair, an implacable pessimism about man's
condition and the presumed values and Ideals he has always
sought, and an acute sense of the vanity of. things, is what
pervades every page of Sartre.

-

Cast willy nllly into an ab

surd world, one must engage in life without hoping for any
thing from it while enjoying with full freedom the rare mo
ments of pleasure that it offers.

In to-day's world where

many do not believe in anything or hope for anything, why med
dle with unverifiable prescriptions or metaphysical creeds
which can only induce self-torture and unrest?

It is to the

present existential reality that one must attach himself, not
to find support in it, since it is inconsistent, but to take
only that little good which it has to offer.
The impossibility of an existential ethics has its meta
physical basis in the exaltation of "being" as antecedent and
opposed to thought.

To ontological phenomenalism logically

40 A compendious view of Jean Paul Sartre's philosophy
can be had by reading the lecture he gave in Paris in 1945.
This work later published, is grounded on the "metaphysic"
developed by his larger work, L»~^tre et le neant. Even Sar
tre's more popular stories and his plays are less literary
than they are doctrinaire. For just as Being and Nothingness
provides an ontological roost from which he may jump into the
void of his own creating, so also the characters in his writ
ings, who seem to be absolutely irrational at times, are really
graphic demonstrations of Sartre's brand of existentialism put
into action. His characters are-"humanistic" in the highest
Sartrean sense of the word, and the short works in which they
appear are catechetical expositions of an atheistic theology
which is specifically a humanism.
*
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corresponds an ethical atomism* both presented in the light
of a false horizontal transcendentalism..
The question may now be asked whether Jean Paul Sartre's
existentialism would have to conform to traditional notions
(as pointed out in the introduction to this paper) of human
ism in order to call itself a humanism.

It would seem not,

for the problem here is to see whether Sartre's existential
ism is a humanism on its own terms or whether it is guilty of
its own "bad faith."
"Bad faith" means, for Sartre, dishonesty.

However, dis

honesty without any moral criteria, simply means a certain in
consistency in the face of "reality”®

Here then, are a few of

Sartre's inconsistencies.
In the first part of his essay, "Existentialism is a hu
manism", Sartre implies that he is struggling against the po
wers- that-be; that he is resisting authority and trying to
rise above his station.

He is a romantic who leaves to man

the possibility of choice.
do not believe in progress.
is always the same.

And yet Sartre maintains that "wa
Progress is betterment, but man

The situation confronting him varies.

But the choice always remains a choice in a situation,”
Cckist., p.52).

So, man rises above his station, but he can

not progress.
For Sartre, "there does exist a universal human condi
tion, “ (Exist., p.45).

The limits are neither subjective nor

objective; rather they have two sides.

They are objective

because found everywhere, and subjective because they are
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non-existent unless lived by man; as he says, "There is a uni
versality

of man but it is not given, it is perpetually be

ing made," (Exist®, p.47).

Then, man is a mystery who can

never be what he is until he is dead.
Again Sartre says that there is no reality except in ac
tion, for man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to
the extent that he fulfils himself.

Man is nothing else than

a series of undertakings; he is the sum, the organization, the
ensemble of the relationships which make up these undertakings.
In other words, " . . .

the coward makes himself cowardly, and

the hero makes himself heroic," (Exist., p.41).

It is because

of this flux that a man can never be a being-in-itself in the
present.
cized.

It is only the past that.can be grasped or stati- .
That is why a man both is and is not what he is and

he cannot totally be what he is until he is dead.
Since the project in the future will involve new condi
tions, man can never really know what he will be and yet Sar
tre states that "there is no doctrine more optimistic, since
man's destiny is within himself," (Exist., p.42).
Sartre starts with the so-called simple, subjective
truth that "outside the Cartesian cogito, all views are only
probable," (Exist., p.44) and he elaborates a theory of prob
ability ,,based on it.

For Sartre, “this theory is the only

one which gives man dignity, the only one which does not re
duce him to an object," (Exist., p.43).

But man reduces him

self to an object in continually striving to be the project
that he has created for himself.

i

'

■
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Man must accept the situation in which he finds himself,
and yet he is responsible for this situation*

"Existential

ism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and
to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on
him," (Exist*. p.19)*
For Sartre, man is a choosing, a self-creating subject
ivity and therefore every choice is not only the best choice
for him but also contains the image of what he wills to be.
At first sight this does not seem to be consistent with his
notion that man chooses in anxiety because he is not only
choosing what he will be but also legislating what all man
kind ought to be, (Exist,, p.20),

But where is the anguish

in making a choice which is necessarily good or the best?
Gould it be that anguish in this existential system stems
from the fact that there are no standards for comparative de
grees of choice since the choice is simply subjective? „ It
would seem then that such words as "the good" or "the best"
are meaningless and that anguish is a result of this meaning
lessness.

But Sartre points out that his anguish is a corre

lative of the question which each man must ask himself before
making a choice.

"Am I really the kind of man who has the

right to act in such a way that humanity might guide itself
by my actions?" (Exist., p.34).

The anguish here is a result

of the fact that there is no answer to the question.

This

question does not, and is not, supposed to indicate a sym
pathy for one's fellow man.

It simply must be asked because

the new world which "I" am about to create by "my" choice
>■
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will involve the other in a new situation and, of course, one
does not know what this situation will he.

There is certain

ly no concern here/ for the "other" "I" can never get to know
as subject, who shatters "my" inner unity, who objectivizes
"me", who is an intruder into "my" world, and whom "I" must
look at, objectivize, in order to regain equilibrium.
There is a paradox involved here for Sartre says that he
perceives all others as the "condition of his own existence,"
(Exist,. p«24).

In order to get any truth about oneself, one

must have contact with another person.

But the contact shat

ters one's inner unity; one is no longer oneself,

"Every man

who sets up a determinism is a dishonest man," (Exist., p.53).
And yet, just previous to this statement, Sartre had said:
"This inability to not make a choice is absolute," (Exist.,
If a man in making a choice does so in anguish because

p.47).

he does not know how it will turn out or what he will be and
yet his future depends upon this choice, is this not an ir
rational and non-deliberate determinism?

But for Sartre man

is freedom.
Every action of man is subject to a moral interpretation.
"Nothing is excusable, man is responsible for his passion,"
(Exist., p.27).

But there are no objective moral principles.

"Moral choice is to be compared to the making of a work of
art.

In choosing his ethics, man makes himself," (Exist.,

p,49)0
The fundamental relation of man with others is conflict.
"Hell is other people."

"The other haemorrhages my inner
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unity. "

Theother is an element of disintegration

verse.

And

in my uni

yet Sartre says:

. . . the subjectivity that we have thus arrived
at, and which we have claimed to be truth, is
not a strictly individual subjectivity, for we
have demonstrated that one discovers in the cogito
not only himself, but others as well, (Exist..
p.44).
In fact a man cannot know himself except as objectivized by ‘
the other.

In spite of the conflict, man must commit himself

to others.
In spite of the apparent contradictions and ambiguities
of an essentially negativistic, pessimistic philosophy of ir
rationalism, Sartre has built a rational system centered up
on man and his condition.
tions:

What is man?

about getting there?
humanism.

He has tried to answer the ques

Where is he going?

and How shall he go

As such, Sartre's work is a brand of

Traditional Christian humanism, which regards man

as provided by God. with certain, graces., talents and gifts.
which must be used to obtain eternal happiness, for Sartre,
is an arbitrary determinism and therefore nonsense.

Nor does

Sartre completely agree with an atheistic humanism which re
gards man as being subjectively responsible for developing
individual “grace" and talent for the purpose of creating a
certain personal happiness as well as uplifting mankind while
reaching for immortality.

As Sartre says;

"This . . .

ory takes man as an end and as a higher value.

the

. . that

I, as man, shall personally consider myself responsible for,
and honored by, acts of a few particular men.

This kind of
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Humanism we can do without.'*

The meaning of humanism, for

Sartre, is this:
Man is constantly outside of himself; in projecting
himself, in losing himself outside of himself, he
makes for m a n ‘s existing; and on the other hand, it
is by pursuing transcendent goals that, he is able
to exist; man being this state of passing beyond,
is at the heart, at the center of this passing be
yond, There is no universe other than a human
universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This
connection between transcendency, as a constitutent
element of man - not in the sense that God is trans
cendent, but in the sense of passing beyond - and
subjectivity, in the sense that man is not closed in
on himself but is always present in a human universe,
is what we call.humanism.
Humanism, because we remind man that there is
no law-maker other than himself, and that in his for
lornness he will decide by himself; because we point
out that man will fulfil himself as man not in turn
ing towards himself but in seeking outside of himself
a goal which is just this liberation, just this part
icular fulfilments (Exist*. p.60).
Given his principles, then, Sartre has constructed a system
which illuminates choice and probability, which stresses the
essential freedom of man and a certain function of the other
in conditioning choice and freedom.

He has developed a the

ory which centers upon and makes possible the existence of
man, given the situation of man and man's condition as Sartre
understands them.

Thus the work is not without value.

On

the contrary the very impetus for this existentialism seems
to be founded upon the essentially religious experience of a
man having come from nothing and going towards nothing — and
as such it has humanistic implications.
But what of the inconsistencies, the apparent “bad
faith?"

Well, if man comes from nothing and for no reason,

then he has an irrational beginning. 'He lives a life about
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which he has only an historical knowledge and moves towards
his own total annihilation*

The only salvation for Sartre,

then, is the rational recognition of irrationalism.
man Greene puts it, this is ”. . .

As Nor

a sort of reverse stoicism,

the living by man of the life determined for him by his pro
ject.”41
In other words, man lives in a condition of indefinite
compounding.
never wins.

The important thing is not to lose, yet one
The essence of liberty lies in the uncertainty

and risk involved in the necessity of action.

This new stoic

ism like the old commands man to look within, to recognize
the universal in himself,, but unlike the old stoicism it can42
not believe that “no natural desire is in vain."
This
stoicism of Sartre's is designed not only to confront exter
nal desolation but also the powerful contradictory impulses
from within as well.

In anguish man will see himself, his

contradictory condition, and his freedom to act “as i f he
were God.
Thus Sartre!s doctrine may properly be called an atheistic
theology for, though it is diametrically opposed to a Godcentered world, nevertheless, it rests its case upon God or
at least upon the “non-existence" of God.

The very impetus

and drive for all of men's actions, according to Sartre, is
41 Norman Greene, Existential Ethics.! (Ann Arbor: I960},
P. 206. /
' ‘
‘
‘
..
42 Simone de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus and Cyneas, Trans. Catherin
Freemantie, Partisan Review, Summer, 1946.
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found in the longing to be and the attempt to become God*

In

facts Sartre implies that the philosophy of existence is im
possible without first annihilating God®

He says that:

Atheistic existentialism., which I represent, is more
coherent. It states that if God does not exist,
there is at least one being in whom existence pre
cedes essence, a being who exists before he can be
defined by any concept, and that this being is man,
or, as Heidegger says, human reality® What is
meant here by saying that existence precedes essence?.
It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up,
appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines
himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives
him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is
nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and
he will have made what he will be. Thus, there is
no human nature, since there is no God to conceive
it. Not only Is man what he conceives himself to
be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be
after this thrust toward existence, (Exist., p.18).
As was shown previously, Descartes, in his search for
“clear and distinct*’ Ideas, ignored the immediate fact of ex
istence.

The dualism of res extensa and res coaitans is

founded essentially on a separation of man's essence from his
existence, and Descartes never succeeded in synthesizing or
welding them together again.

The reaction of the existential

ists was to expose man as a feeling creature, a finite crea
ture caught In the paradox of his search for the Infinite.
A creature that must believe his heart because his reason Is
inadequate.
Since the vex*y basis of our action is founded upon an

assumed impossibility, i.e. the existence of God and the tend
ing of man toward God, Sartre's chief effort is to get man to
face squarely the implications for personal action in a uni
verse without purpose.

Starting with an assumed first
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principle, that of the non-existence of God, and denying the
existence of a fixed human nature, man is allowed no exter
nal support and is therefore fully responsible for his own
character, judgments and choices®
Kierkegaard, for example, ’understood man as a creature
who cannot prove the existence of God but who leaps to Him in
an act of ultimate faith®
God®

Sartre, however, leaps away from

The fact of God for Sartre is an illusion caused by cer

tain basic aspects of the total human condition®

In fact,

belief in God, for Sartre, is detrimental to human welfare
and is caused by a form of ’’bad faith" or refusal to face the
fact of human freedom.

» • the first act of bad faith is'

to flee what It cannot flee, to flee what it is,81 (Exist.,
p 015).

Bad faith is a response to a situation in which man

faces the difficulty of conquering himself as a self in a
world created by others, but which he, by virtue of the ne
cessity of his dependence accepts as his own®
the world as it appears to him.

He must assert

The recognition of freedom is

inseparable from anguish and the recognition of solitude is
accompanied by nausea®

Desire breeds frustration and satis

faction is impossible®

It is the "human condition" with its

inner conflict and struggle which leads to "bad faith”, (B.K.

P © id 3a
Sartre admits that in claiming to be an atheist he is
going beyond the certainty of experience to the realm of the
hypothetical and probable.

The existence or non-existence

of God is a metaphysical question for him, and he regards

DXNERSfTY OF WHDSOR LIBRARY
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metaphysics as an imaginative enterprise incapable of yield
ing certainty®

Sartre's ontology differs from a metaphysics

in that it is a description of facts, and thus, he believes,
it is subject to the criteria of truth or falsity*

He seems

to have a basic reluctance to assume more than is justified
by the "clear" testimony of experience*
Sartre is preoccupied

essentially,,with men-in-situa-

tionsa with man and the human condition of man, but he seems
to be looking at man from the point of view of a psychologist
or sociologist, even though his work is couched in quasiphilosophic language®
one studying Sartre

First, let it be kept in mind that
is dealing with a phenomenology and as

such the work is limited to subjective description®

For this

reason it cannot be a philosophy either of being or of nothing
ness, for the intuition of either of these notions must nec
essarily be outside of any particular phenomenon®

By the

same token it cannot be a humanism in the traditional sense,
because traditional humanism draws upon principles, norms and
criteria obtaining in a penetrating analysis of the human per-_
son*

In spite of the fact that Sartre makes the "human condi

tion5" the central theme of his '"description", this could never
take the place of a philosophical analysis any more than the
confessional could take the place of psycho-analysis or soci

ology could take the place of moral theology®
The final metaphysical breakdown is forced upon Sartre by
his own phenomenological criteria when he attempts to discuss
existence prescinded from essence®

This destroys’the very
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existences, the starting point of Sartre's system because of
an all exclusive concentration upon existences

One is speak

ing of nothing If he attempts to speak of an essence which
does not exist in some way, and so9 also, Sartre is speaking
of nothing when he attempts to talk about individual exist
ent s which are not some-tilings, which have no form or nature;
which, in other words, are unspeakable*

By throwing out

natures, Sartre -also destroys existence and from then on his
existents have, strangely3 many essential characteristics.
(For example, existence is essentially free.)
Rather than a metaphysic or even a philosophy of nature,
what Sartre has here is a description of the interplay of en
vironmental factors conditioning the man (psychology) or his
collectivity (sociology), which description is itself invol
ved In this "human condition"®
Farther, Sartre not only destroys existence but he also
destroys discourse.

Plato saw the need of constructing some

thing other than being (non-being), in order to talk about
being.

The attempt of Sartre to create a rational system of

description of totally Involved personal irrationalism, us
ing terms which Invalidate themselves, communicating the in
communicable and speaking about an unspeakable subject Is
ambiguous.
The obvious moral breakdown of Sartre's existential hu
manism is a result of the ambiguity of measuring without a
measure8

The culmination of a vain and pretentious humanism

which attempts to seal man off from God and make the creature
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instead of the creator the measure of all things, is precisely
this kind of ultra-personal individualism*
There can be little doubt that much of the success of
Sartre and his philosophic and theological offspring is due
to the new way of propagating ideas through literature es
pecially the novel and the drama*

The exponents of existen

tialism, particularly in France* immediately saw the advant
ages of literature over any formal scientific exposition for
presenting the individual in his concrete existence,,

Sartre's

drama, Les Diablo s. et Le Pan Plan.* for example, has had far .
greater influence than his treatise Being and Nothingness*
Sartre passes from philosophy to the novel* to tragedy and to
comedy without shifting his grounds because for him the the
atre is nothing more than phenomenology played out on a stage.
In his dramas Sartre portrays the infietermination of
human freedom, the contingency and absurdity of an existence
in which human acts are disconnected, of no logical or moral
significance, or in Sartrian terminology, wholly gratuitous.
It is evident that psychoanalysis, both as a method of
psycho-therapy and as a branch of empirical psychology, has
had tremendous influence everywhere and holds the interest of
countless individuals.

One consequence of this new science

of man has been the desire to institute new norms which are
independent of natural and Christian morality.

Unconscious

dynamisms and determinations lie beneath the apparent calm of
consciousness and are guided by their own laws according to
psychology.

These laws and their dynamisms are- imperious in
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their demands upon man !s conscious behaviour*

Conscience is

not, as it may appear, a clear and placid realm where Judg
ments of moral value regarding individual acts are reached.
It is rather a bundle of psychic energy rooted in instinctive
and unconscious soil.
It is further affirmed that the evolution of conscience
in its intellectual and affective formation is an extremely
complicated phenomenon whose harmonious development and per
fect maturation is found only in rare instances.

In its ef

forts to adapt itself to the real, the ego is barraged and
battered by unbridled impulses of pleasure on one hand and
by the inhibitions of external morality ox the other.

If

this conflict of the ago with the Id and superego is not hap
pily resolved* we then have one or the other complex or arrestation of the psychic dynamism.

This degenerates progres

sively Into nervous disorders* into intellectuals affective,
and sensual regressions which fetter for one's entire life
the jp

ection and freedom of moral acts.

Nearly all persons, according to the psychoanalysts are
afflicted with some such psychological devolution*

If the

psychic equilibrium is not evident,, it Is because the defects
have been compensated by other capacities and resources of
the individual.

Hence some inclinations, even though the

most noble and moral, can be found to be related to distur
bances and regressions in the depth of the psyche.

The parti

cular tone of one's affections, of one's manner of seeing and
Judging, is always linked to this mysterious part' of oneself.

*

■■
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One must be careful not to confuse virtue with what might be
merely a defective development In a part of the personality.
If this is. carried to its logical limit* the unconscious
dynamisms could, not only inhibit the free exercise- of the will*
they could actually exclude, it altogether.. These forces bring
such extrinsic pressure to bear on the subject* that although
the will remains free to offer its theoretical consent to the
moral judgment of conscience* it is nevertheless physically
impossible to actualize that judgment*
Man'to-day has a horror of the fixed* the determinate,
the eternal.

Three persons seated upon divans in a parlour

look out of painted windows with no other amusement than
their mutual self-torture carried on in a delirium which al
ways returns to where it began®

This* according to Sartre,

Is man's hell, and it Is shared by all those who cannot dis
cover the true sense, at once human and divine, of man's
fleeting and painful existence on earth*
Criticism, of 3ar.trq
But even as a psychology, Sartre's existentialism disin
tegrates thought more than promoting or enriching it, and
those who have written defensive critiques of Sartre's work,
such as Maurice Nathanson, have been very subtle in negating
the most positive assertions of Sartre whose logic ends up by
destroying itself*
A philosopher who considers rationality the supreme Il
lusion of human consciousness is a priori not even worthy of

>

■■
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criticism*

Therefore it is a moot question whether Sartre is

right or wrong, whether he is a charlatan of genius or a poor
fellow caught in the trap of his own dialectics.
The fact that Sartrean existentialism expresses itself
in a whole series of morbid literary works seems to corrobo- ’
AS
rate the opinions of critics such as Roger Troisfontaines,
that this is not simply a reaction against the rationalistic
and idealistic trends which too long dominated philosophical
thought in the nineteenth,, and at the beginning of the twen
tieth
ile.

century, cutting that thought off and making it ster- ,
Rather, they recognise that this noisy explosion of ex

istentialism had emotional roots and arose out of the fright
ful cataclysm of war*
It Is well that Sartre has raised the question of the
meaning of human existence for all reflection should take In
to account the destiny of man himself®

Philosophy is not

only a scheme of ideas; it is the establishment of a position
with regard to the absolute and each one of us, at every mo
ment, irrevocably stakes Infinite values®

But one should not

allow the abuse of deadening abstractions to throw one into
the sticky subjectivity of the hard existent, as the exagger
ated systematization of Hegel drove Kierkegaard to clench his
fists in a fit of fideistic despair®

Philosophy, which Is an

understanding of reality, Is not based upon the' particular,
sunk into itself, nor upon bloodless generalities.
43 Roger Troisfontaines “Existentialism and Christianity1’,
Trans® M„ J®, Kerr
(London: Adam & CharlesBlack Co®, 1949).
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When, with regard to action9s internal springs, one tries
to describe the interlocking links of action, one should
never do it as if analysis were sufficient of itself, or as
if description could be gratuitous•

There are over-all struc

tures, supra-individual standards, organic wholes, and intel
ligible syntheses®

In short, there are regulative and judi

cative truths without which Sartre could not realize that
physical being constantly becomes stickier, like a homogene
ous mass, nor that consciousness expands like a fullness
overflowing, nor, above all, that the two oppose each other,either painfully to prolong their separation, or to project
themselves, discovering In the unexpectedness of this leap
forward the very essence of freedom from any value*

If Sar

tre's phenomenology has continued to develop contradictory
dialectics, it Is because he has revived the divorce between
the Individual and the universal®

He starts by making the

individual sacrosanct and to this one point, chosen arbitrar
ily, Is then tries to bring all the facets and values of ex
istence into this perspective, cost what it may*
worst of all abstractions:

This is the .

to seek to reduce to an Identical

norm— ■arbitrarily conceived — the diverse reactions and
needs of human beings which can be Integrated only in a hier
archy of principles and values»

If Sartrian humanism is only

true for Sartre, then it may be said that it Is no longer
true, even for himj truth and universality are one®
Once the initial perspective of humanism is distorted,
the vision of the whole remains disturbed*

What are these
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notions of '•factitiousness'1, “utility11, “existential choice*',
and even, of equivocal "transcendence"?

The simple state

ment of a "pure" fact is unintelligible; the most elementary
fact is always in some degree elaborated so that the penetra
tion of the object by the subject began long before Sartre
declared that it was impossible*

Similarly, what clear-cut

idea is one to understand when Sartre, in the mode of pragma
tism, speaks of the artificiality of the world?

This notion

turns back upon its creator to prove to him that, if the
world is relative to his ability to construct it, far from
being enslaved by "mundaneness", he can dominate "mundaneness"
by the absoluteness of the spirit*

As for the idea of "pure

choice", identified with the blind existential urge, it means
only an obscure tendency, radically biological, with utilitar
ian or hedonistic fruits,

If no coherent science can be

worked out concerning existence, and freedom is conceived
without an inwardness that is both demanding and sanctioning,
not only does all metaphysics or morality become impossible,
but all reason becomes impossible too.

Finally, what can be

said o„ the caricature of transcendence that is offered by
Sartre to designate in turn the exterior position of the ex
istent "with regard to himself, his privacy over nothingness,
his very precarious.control of the world and his "project"
within an illusory freedom.

Nowhere Is the authentic trans

cendence of the immanent and demanding Absolute discussed,
and, fundamentally, it is logical that this system which has
brought the mind down to the level of the irrational should
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bring transcendence down to the level of the unreal.
From Sartre's existential humanism the idea to be retain
ed is that a practical and militant philosophy is necessary,
since in the question, "What is man?", Sartre is Included and
compromised to the point where he can no longer answer ob
jectively without taking a stand for or against his own exis
tence,

It has been the goal of philosophical effort to show

that the idea of an act and the act itself are not the same
thing and that a proper place in philosophy must be given to
that which until now seemed impossible to identify in the ex
treme diversity of the elusive contingency which attends con
crete existences.
Sartrean humanism?

But what can be retained of the negative
Its psychoanalytical explorations have

revealed as yet unplumbed depths of egoism and perversity in
man, rather than treasures of generosity.

Can Sartre be said

to have enriched one's knowledge of humanity by his contri
bution of cynical "totalism"?
is always of the spirit.

Definitely not, for the truth

It disintegrates in descriptive

complacency and the workings of an unhealthy imagination dis
turbed by animal cravings.

It seems that Sartre does not

really wish to solve the problems of existence but rather to
curb

one's right to raise the real problems.

This may be

why he destroys, a priori, any relationship between the sub
ject and the object, between the subject and himself, between
the subject and other subject®

But then, whom will he con

vince that man lives only for this disgusting "mess" and.that
he dies merely to prove the absurdity of life? .Ihy must the
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irrational be the favourite food of man's reason, rather than
that which transcends it and fulfils it?

Could it be because

reason can juggle with the unreasonable, while it must show
itself humble before standards that go beyond it?

It is time

now for the mind, after this sortie into the Darkness, to re
affirm its rights to universality and inwardness, instead of
allowing itself to be deceived by an overly visceral imagin
ation e
Sartre has- tried to construct a radical philosophy of
freedom©

Yet by it one is not led down the road to the deif

ication of man®

On the contrary, the freedom of which Sartre

speaks is not a positive and creative freedom®
structive, annihilative. freedom.

It is a de

Sartre looks upon man as the

being that is the source of nothingness.

Had not human real

ity sprung up, like an erosive canker, in the very heart of
being, being would always be unchanged; nothingness would not
exist®

If nothingness has come to exist it is due to this

most singular act, human reality, which is consequently the
sole basis of nothingness in the heart of being.

And why is

man the source of nothingness?

Because he is free, unique

among all beings in the world.

T’reedom is the condition of

the work of annihilation carried out by man in the heart of
being®

Thus freedom is not merely a sentence passed on man,

in the sense that he himself has not chosen it; it is also
the fundamental condition of the nothingness which is man
and which he has carved out of being, like a hole that may
never be filled in®

Sartre's man is the sheer antithesis of
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God, who creates the world out of nothingness; he creates
nothingness out of the world.
No more radical and paradoxical inversion of humanism
could be imagined.

In traditional humanism man builds and

enriches the world through his works.

In Sartre's conception,

man delves within the world like a worm, grinding it into
fragments, corroding it and impoverishing it.

Man is a use

less passion, (B.N., p.615).
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